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NOTES
ESTATE TAX VALUATION OF MUTUAL FUND
SHARES. AN UNREALISTIC REGULATION
The Federal Estate Tax, "originally conceived as an emergency
measure,"1 is a permanently established feature of today's taxing sys-
tem. Imposed upon the privilege of transmitting property at death,
the estate tax is measured according to the value of the property trans-
ferred.2 Specified exemptions and deductions are deducted from the
value of the gross estate3 resulting in the taxable estate which is taxed
at a progressive rate, graduated according to estate size. 4 Since the
tax is measured according to value, the valuation procedures used are
of prime importance in computing the amount of tax due.
The cryptic provisions of the Internal Revenue Code offer little
guidance in ascertaining the value of the gross estate, indicating
merely-
The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined
by including to the extent provided for in this part, the value at
the time of his death of all property, real or personal, tangible or
intangible, wherever situated.5
The code also provides that "[tihe value of the gross estate shall in-
clude the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein of
the decedent at the time of his death."' 6  Although Congress has en-
acted similar statutes since 1916,1 all of these provisions likewise have
1. C. LOWNDES & R. KatMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXES § 2.1, at 5
(2d ed. 1962) [hereinafter cited as LOWNDES & KRAmER]. The Federal Estate Tax
was originally instituted "to defray the cost of preparedness as represented m the addi-
tional appropriations for the Army, Navy, fortifications, Military Academy, and de-
ficiencies caused by the military situation." S. REP. No. 793, 64th Cong., ist Sess. 1
(1916).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 2001, 2031, 2033.
3. Id. §§ 2051-56.
4. Id. § 2001.
5. Id. § 2031.
6. Id. § 2033.
7. "[Be it enacted] SEC. 202. That the value of the gross estate of the decedent
shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property, real
or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated:
(a) To the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of this death
[241]
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been couched in general terms, and Congress has delegated to the In-
ternal Revenue commissioner the power to issue "needful rules and
regulations" implementing statutory intent.8
In pursuance of this delegated duty, the commissioner has issued
numerous regulations on valuation of property for estate tax purposes.
A relatively recent treasury regulation on valuation has become the cen-
ter of a growing controversy. This regulation prescribes a new cri-
terion to be used in mutual fund9 share valuation:
The fair market value of a share in an open-end investment com-
pany (commonly known as a "mutual fund") is the public offering
price of a share, adjusted for any reduction in price available to
the public in acquiring the number of shares being valued. 10
Since the public offering price of load fund shares includes an acquisi-
tion expense or sales load which adds nothing to the value of the
shares," this regulation has been strongly criticized as unrealistic and
which after his death is subject to the payment of the charges against his estate and the
expenses of its administration and is subject to distribution as part of his estate."
Int. Rev. Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 202, 39 Stat. 777.
8. The Internal Revenue commissioner's authorization to issue "needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement of this title" is currently embodied in section
7805(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. He had been authorized to issue
such regulations prior to institution of the Federal Estate Tax. Act of Dec. 1, 1873,
ch. 8, § 321, 18 Stat. 52. The commissioner was specifically authorized to promulgate
regulations for estate tax in 1916. Int. Rev. Act of 1916, ch. 463, § 212, 39 Stat. 780.
9. A mutual fund, or open-end investment company, sells shares in itself and
with the proceeds invests in the securities of other companies. It is required by law to
offer its shares only at a "current public offering price described in the prospectus"
(public offering price), Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22(d)
(1970), and to repurchase its shares from owners wishing to sell at their current net
asset value (redemption price), id., §§ 80a-2(a) (32), 80a-3 (a), 80a-4(3), 80a-5(a) (1),
80a-22(a)(1). At the end of 1971, there were 10.9 million mutual fund shareowner
accounts. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1972 MUTUAL FUND FACT BOOK 3. On
formation, structure and operation of mutual funds, see generally SEC, PUBLIC
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]; Lobell, The Mutual
Fund: a Structural Analysis, 47 VA. L. REv. 181 (1961); Conference on Mutual Funds,
115 U. PA. L. REV. 659 (1967).
10. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-8(b), T.D. 6680, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 418-19.
11. The public offering price of a no-load fund is established by deducting its
liabilities from the total market value of its assets and dividing the result by the
number of shares outstanding. Public offering price thus approximates the current net
asset value per share outstanding. However, shares of a load fund, distributed
through underwriters, dealers and brokers, include in their public offering price a sales
load which is frequently as high as 9.3 percent of the net asset value of shares pur-
chased. The difference between public offering price and redemption price of load
funds thus represents the sales load. The current controversy revolves around
whether this acquisition charge, or sales load, should be included in the "value of the
gross estate." Authorities on mutual funds have made the following observations:
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unreasonable. Taxpayers' challenges to Treasury Regulation 20.2031-
8(b) have resulted in conflicting decisions among the federal courts of
appeal.' 2  Recently, the Ninth Circuit in Davis v. United States'3 and
the Second Circuit in Cartwright v. United States 4 have held this regu-
lation invalid.
This note will discuss relevant valuation criteria prescribed in past
regulations, consider arguments for and against the present mutual
fund share regulation, and review decisions ruling upon its validity.
This note will conclude with a recommendation that the well reasoned
decision of Cartwright be affirmed.
Estate Tax-Regulatory History
Courts which have upheld Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) re-
peatedly have cited Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co. 5 That
case stated that "Treasury Regulations. .. constitute contemporaneous
constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which
should not be overruled except for weighty reasons."' 6 Treasury Regu-
lation 20.2031-8 (b), however, is not a contemporaneous construction of
"The sales charge goes solely to compensating the salesman, and for promotion. Not a
cent of this pays for fund managements investment advice or otherwise benefits the
fund itself in any way." N. DACEY, DACEY ON MUTUAL FUNDS 47 (1970) [herein-
after cited as DACEY]. It is not the value of mutual fund assets, but "[c]ompetition for
dealer interest among ... underwriters" which has "exerted an upward pressure on
sales loads." H.R. REP., supra note 9, at 56. The result of this "upward pressure" is
that mutual fund sharl4olders "usually pay considerably more to acquire their shares
than other types of investors pay for both the acquisition and the sale of their shares."
Id. at 77. An investor who "has already decided to buy a particular [load] fund's
shares must ...pay sales charges designed to cover selling efforts that he does not
*'ant, does not need, and does not get." Id. at 221. "No-load funds ...furnish the
same professionally managed, diversified portfolios as load funds do; yet no-load fund
shares are available without the sales charges that investors pay when they buy load
fund shares. . . . Managerial expertise and portfolio diversification are paid for by
other charges. . . . The sales load . .. is purely a payment for selling effort."
Id. at 214-15. The Securities and Exchange Commission recommended statutory pro-
hibition of sale of mutual fund shares at a public offering price comprising a sales load
of more than five percent of the sum actually invested by the issuer of the shares.
Hearings on S. 1659 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.,
1st Sess., 924 (1967).
12. See text accompanying notes 60-70 infra.
13. 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).
14. 457 F.2d 567 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 41 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 10,
1972).
15. 333 U.S. 496 (1948), cited in Ruehlmann v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302,
1304 (6th Cir. 1969); Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45, 48 (7th Cir. 1969); Wells
v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 871, 875 (1968).
16. 333 U.S. at 501.
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any provision of the Internal Revenue Code, 1 7 nor does it follow closely
upon the advent of mutual funds, which originally appeared in the
United States in the 1920's. i"
Perhaps, then, some guidance in the current controversy may be
found by consulting the more nearly "contemporaneous constructions
by those charged with administration of these statutes .... ,' Regu-
lations issued in 1921 specified that the "value to be ascertained [in
determining value of the gross estate] is the market, or sale, value of
the property" 20 while those of 1924 used the formula of "fair market
value."21  As noted by one commentator:
The Federal Estate Tax Statute does not define the word "Value"
but uses the term . . . without limitation. In the absence of a
statutory definition the Treasury Department has defined the terms
as meaning "fair market value" and this definition, which accords
with the evident intent of the statute, has been accepted without
question and is clearly correct.
22
Reference to the regulations preceding those in which the phrase "fair
market value" first appeared helps explain the meaning which that
phrase was intended to convey. After indicating that the pertinent
value was the market, or sale, value of the property, the 1921 Regula-
tions elucidated:
The highest price obtainable for the property within a reasonable
period of the decedent's death is the value to be included. A sale
of the property, however, in order to be accepted as the criterion
of value, must be made in such manner as to insure the best
price obtainable under existing circumstances. This requires (a)
that the sale be made as a matter of business, and not merely in
order to establish value; (b) . . . with a view to realizing as high
a price as possible; and (c) that reasonable care and skill be exer-
cised to obtain such price.
23
Market value in this regulation was defined as the value in cash
which the estate could obtain by sale of the property. This general
valuation principle has been expressed in an income tax context
as "what-you-could-have-got-for-it-in-money-if-you-had-sold-it. '2 4  The
17. "[Slince the statutory definition of value had been in the Revenue Acts
since 1916, it is obvious that this Regulation cannot in any sense be deemed a con-
temporaneous construction of the statute ...... Davis v. United States, 306 F. Supp.
949, 953 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
18. DACEY, supra note 11, at 23.
19. 333 U.S. at 501.
20. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14 (1921).
21. Treas. Reg. 68, Art. 13(1) (1924).
22. 2 CCH STANDARD FEDERAL TAX SERv., 2021.02 (1931).
23. Treas. Reg. 37, Art. 14 (1921).
24. Andrews v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 314, 317 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320
U.S. 748 (1943). While this definition was promulgated in an income tax context,
"t]here is no distinction, for most purposes . . . in the meaning of fair market value
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sale requirements enumerated in the 1921 version of the regulations
were condensed the following year in a formula which has survived in
substance down to the present regulations:
[Market value is] the price which a willing buyer will pay to a
willing seller for the property in question under the circumstances
existing at the date of the decedent's death or within such reason-
able period thereafter as would afford proper opportunity for an
examination and sale thereof.
25
The "willing-buyer-willing seller" formula thus emerged as a more
generalized rule. That is, the estate was valued by theoretically placing
the executor in the role of a good faith willing seller vis-h-vis a good
faith willing buyer, thereby excluding a collusive sale for the purpose of
establishing a low valuation of property.
This willing buyer-willing seller formula has been explained by
Lowndes and Kramer as the proper valuation rule:
Valuation is based upon the gross amount which the willing buyer
will presumably pay without any subtraction for the seller's selling
costs or commissions, income taxes, or other taxes payable by the
seller out of the proceeds of the property, such as sales and excise
taxes.26
Inherent in this explanation is the understanding that the estate is the
willing seller. Thus it appears that "[tihe touchstone of fair market value
has always been the price which a willing seller could reasonably be
expected to be able to obtain from a disposition of the property in
question."2 7
Valuation of Mutual Fund Shares
The general willing buyer-willing seller rule has been found to be
inappropriate for valuation of a specific category of property interests.
This class of property interests, comprised of certain life insurance and
annuity contracts, has been recognized as requiring a special valuation
rule because of their atypical character.2 In contrast, mutual fund
as used in an estate tax case and one involving income tax." Champion v. Commis-
sioner, 303 F.2d 887, 892-93 (5th Cir. 1962).
25. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 13 (1922). For current phrasing see Treas. Reg. § 20.-
2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 CuM. BuLL. 368.
26. LOwNDs & KRAwmR, supra note 1, § 18.12, at 441.
27. Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 871, 878 (1968) (Tannenwald, J., dissent-
ing). Judge Tannenwald concluded: "It is the total amount obtainable by the seller
from the only available actual purchaser, not the price -which a theoretical purchaser
would pay another seller, which should control." Id. at 880.
28. Characteristics peculiar to such insurance policies had been deemed to justify
their evaluation for gift and estate tax purposes at replacement value. United-States.v.
Ryerson, 312 U.S. 260 (1941); Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312"U.S. 254 (1941); DuPont
v. Commissioner, 233 F.2d 210 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956). - "- ., - •
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shares had been recognized by the commissioner to be in the same classi-
fication as securities which were valued under the willing buyer-willing
seller rule.2" However, by issuing Treasury Regulation 20.2013-8(b),
the commissioner unexpectedly classified mutual fund shares with insur-
ance and annuity contracts. While the mutual fund shares had "super-
ficial similarities"30 with such contracts, they were fundamentally dis-
parate in nature.
" '[I]nsurance' involves a guarantee that at least some fraction of
the benefits will be payable in fixed amounts,"31 and "[a]n annuity
may be defined as an insurance contract wherein the insurer, in consid-
eration of a certain premium, promises to pay a definite amount of in-
come to the annuitant. ' 32  In comparison, mutual fund shares do not
entail a contract for payment of a fixed sum. The owner of an insur-
ance contract may be able to sell it for more than its cash surrender
value, but the owner of mutual fund shares realistically cannot expect
to obtain more than their redemption price upon sale.13  Contractual
assurance that a specified sum will be paid, possibility of sale at more
than cash surrender value and considerations of varying insurability34
help justify valuation of insurance and annuity contracts at replacement
value. No such justification exists in the case of mutual fund shares. 5
The classification of insurance contracts and mutual fund shares
in the same category carried in its wake a fundamental and radical
change in mutual fund share valuation. Taxpayers had formerly val-
ued such shares at redemption price-the sum which the estate could
realize by their sale.36  Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b), by requir-
ing inclusion of the sales load in valuation of mutual fund shares, in
effect ordered the estate to value the shares at their "retail" cost. The
29. Report of the Committee on Estate & Gift Taxes, 19 BULL. A.B.A. SEC-
TION OF TAXATON, July 1966, at 73.
30. Comment, Taxation-Valuation of Shares in Open-End Investment Com-
panies for Federal Estate Tax Purposes Held to Be Replacement Cost, 44 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 416, 419 (1969).
31. SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 71 (1959).
32. Meisenholder, Taxation of Annuity Contracts under Estate and Inheritance
Taxes, 39 MICH. L. REv. 856, 863 n.17 (1941).
33. Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 569 (2d Cir. 1972).
34. "[Wlhen the insured is uninsurable, the policy is worth more than the cost
of a like policy ...... 54 HARv. L. REv. 894, 895 (1941).
35. One essential difference between insurance contracts and mutual fund shares
is that mutual fund shares do not furnish the "type of promise which is basic to an in-
surance undertaking." Gordon, Investment-Insurance Arrangements, in CONFERENCE
ON MUTUAL FuNDs 34 (1966). "[Tlhe mutual fund cannot promise to . .. pay any
specific amount of income." INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, 1972 MUTUAL FUND
FACT BOOK 5.
36. Report of the Committee on Estate & Gilt Taxes, 19 BULL. A.B.A. SECTION
OF TAXATION, July 1966, at 73. See also text accompanying note 29 supra.
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improper classification of mutual fund shares with insurance contracts
resulted in treating the estate as a willing buyer instead of the tradi-
tionally accepted willing seller.
20.2031-8 (b)-The Beginning
What began as an erroneous categorizing of mutual fund shares
with insurance contracts was to have still further consequences. Regu-
lation 20.2031-8(b) prescribing valuation of mutual fund shares repre-
sented the vanguard effort of the commissioner to effect a fundamental
change in the method of property valuation for estate tax purposes.
One day subsequent to the issuance of 20.2031-8(b), an amendment
prescribing a retail basis of valuation for all "property in general" made
its appearance as a proposal "in tentative form" in the Federal Register.
3 7
Previously, the Estate Tax Regulations had offered the traditional ex-
plication of fair market value:
The fair market value is the price at which the property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, nei-
ther being under any compulsion to buy or to sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts. The fair market value
of a particular item of property includible in the decedent's gross
estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price.38
In 1965, however, 20.2031-1(b) was amended to include the follow-
ing sentences:
Nor is the fair market value of an item of property to be deter-
mined by the sale price of the item in a market other than that in
which such item is most commonly sold to the public. . . . Thus,
in the case of an item of property includible in the decedent's
gross estate, which is generally obtained by the public in the retail
market, the fair market value of such an item of property is the
price at which the item or a comparable item would be sold at
retail. For example, the fair market value of an automobile (an
article generally obtained by the public in the retail market) ii-
cludible in the decedent's gross estate is the price for which an
automobile of the same or approximately the same description,
make, model, age, condition, etc., could be purchased by a mem-
ber of the general public and not the price for which the particular
automobile of the decedent would be purchased by a dealer in
used automobiles. 39
Thus Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b), owing its existence to
an unwarranted classification of mutual fund shares with insurance and
annuity contracts, served as a precedent for the more ambitious amend-
ment of 1965. This amendment to 20.2031-1(b) in turn was used by
the commissioner as a bootstrap argument when estate taxpayers later
37. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), 28 Fed. Reg. 10882 (1963).
38. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 Cum. BuLL. 479.
39. Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b), T.D. 6826, 1965-2 CuM. DuLL. 368.
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contested valuation of their mutual fund shares at a figure greater than
that which could be realized by their sale:
The method prescribed by Section 20.2031-8(b) for the valua-
tion of mutual fund shares accords with the principles of valuation
for estate tax purposes set forth in the more general regulation
(Section 20.2031-1(b)), which provides that the fair market
value of an item generally obtainable at retail is its retail price
and not the price obtainable by selling it back to a dealer. 40
To date, as noted in a taxpayer's challenge of the mutual funds
regulation, the departure from traditional estate tax valuation of prop-
erty embodied in Treasury Regulation 20.2031-1(b)'s retail market
theory of valuation is not being enforced by the commissioner. 41 It is
only the narrower retail market theory of 20.2031-8(b) which the
commissioner is endeavoring to enforce and which has recently created
conflict between the circuits.
Realistic Valuation of Securities
Despite the anomalous grouping of mutual fund shares with in-
surance and annuity contracts in the current regulations, "[tlhe first les-
son which we must learn in connection with mutual funds is that mutual
fund shares constitute securities. ' 42  Thus, the revolutionary character
of the new regulation concerning valuation of mutual fund shares can
be highlighted by consideration of other regulations pertaining to estate
tax valuation of securities. An early regulation for security valuation
provided:
The value of stocks and bonds listed upon a stock exchange
should be determined by taking the mean between the highest and
lowest quoted selling price upon the date of death ...
Where securities are actively quoted on a bid and asked basis and
actual sales are not available, the bid price as of the date of death
will be accepted as the value.43
In the over-the-counter securities market, the bid price, or what the
dealer "maintaining a market"41 in a particular security is offering to
pay, approximates what the owner may expect to get for his stock.
40. Brief for Appellant at 13, Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.
1972).
41. Brief for Appellee at 23, Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567 (2d
Cir. 1972).
42. Hopper, Antifraud and Disclosure Requirements in Selling Investment Com-
pany Securities, in CONFERENCE ON MUTUAL FUNDS 15 (1966).
43. Treas. Reg. 63, Art. 14(2) (1922).
44. A dealer "maintains a market" in a security when he "is known to be
willing at all times to buy or sell that security . . . at the prices he quotes." L. LOLL,
JR. & J. BUCKLEY, THE OVER-THE-COUNTER SECURITIES MARKETS 146 (2d ed. 1967).
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In the exchange or auction market, however, a sale is more likely to
occur between the highest bid and the lowest asked price. Perhaps
with the exchange market in mind, the regulation was amended in
1934 to read:
In the case securities are quoted on a bona fide bid and asked ba-
sis, and actual sales are not available, the mean between the bid
and asked prices as of the date of death, or the nearest date thereto
if within a reasonable time thereof, will be accepted as the
value.
45
These principles of valuation of securities were based on market
realities. However, the commissioner in amending the regulations has
not always examined such realities when defining fair market value.
For example, when an estate included large blocks of corporate stock,
taxpayers contended that it was not realistic to arrive at the fair market
value of such a block by multiplying the value of one share times the
number of shares held by the estate. This contention was premised
on the fact that placing a large block of stock on the market would
depress the per share price. This blockage theory, although in accord
with the meaning of fair market value as used in the regulations, was
vigorously contested by the commissioner, and in 1934 the regulations
were amended to specifically prohibit the use of the blockage principle:
The fair market value of a particular kind of property includible
m the gross estate is not to be determined by a forced sale price
or by an estimate of what a whole block or aggregate would
fetch if placed upon the market at one and the same time.46
The size of holdings of any security to be included in the gross
estate is not a relevant factor and will not be considered in such
determination. 4
7
Despite the commissioner's "broadside. leveled at any 'Block-
age Rule',"48 taxpayers still contended that refusal to apply such a rule
resulted in a "formalistic method which is at variance with
45. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(3) (1934). In McNary v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.
467 (1967), a taxpayer petitioned the Tax Court to find that "the only proper cn-
tenon for determining the fair market value of the securities included in the assets of
this estate, the values of which were, on the valuation date, quoted on the over-the
counter market, is the quoted bid price " McNary v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 467,
469 (1967). The court in holding for respondent emphasized that petitioner had
taken its position "[wjithout the citation of any authority." Id. Authority may
perhaps be found in the original reading of the applicable regulation. The 1934
amendment allows a more exact valuation of "fair market value" or what the owner
can obtain by sale of stock quoted on an exchange, but it may not lead to a more reason-
able determination of "fair market value" of stock which is sold over the counter.
46. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 13(1) "(193).
47. Id., Art. 13(3).
48. Peters, The tiif -"Mrket Value of Blbckay of Stock, 17 TAxEs 17, 18 (1939).
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reality" 9 -the pertinent reality being "the point at which supposititious
willing buyers might agree with this seller."5
In a case where decedent owned 35,966 shares of a particular
stock, the commissioner valued this block at $44 per share, based on
sales of a few hundred shares at prices between $45 and $43 on the
date of death. In view of the general downward trend, it was certain
that if so large a block had been placed on the market on that date,
"the price would ... have . . . been instantly depressed."'" Conclud-
ing that "the Commissioner's method . . . does not, as to this block of
shares, result in a figure which is consistent with reality,' ' 2 the Board
of Tax Appeals found that the value of the 35,966 share block was not
more than $35 per share. The Fourth Circuit affirmed holding that
"the Board was right in basing its conclusions upon the realities as it
found them . . . . It could not ignore the pregnant fact, having found
it to exist, that a large block of stock cannot be marketed and turned
into money as readily as a few shares. 53  The Fourth Circuit in a
subsequent decision in which it applied the blockage rule stated that
its decision was reached "notwithstanding the restrictive provisions of
the regulations."' Another court, in applying the blockage rule, rec-
onciled its decision with the regulations stating: "[tihe regulations
. . . provide that 'all relevant facts and elements of value as of the
time of the decedent's death should be considered in every case.' ""
The practical outcome of these cases was similar, because both courts
refused to be bound by a regulation not "consistent with reality.
56
49. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 35 B.T.A. 259, 262 (1937).
50. Id. at 263.
51. Id. at 262.
52. Id. at 262-63.
53. Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 95 F.2d 806, 812 (4th Cir. 1938).
54. Helvering v. Kimberly, 97 F.2d 433, 434 (4th Cir. 1938). This case con-
cerned valuation for gift tax purposes, but the Gift Tax Regulations had been simi-
larly amended to include an anti-blockage provision. Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 19(3)
(1932).
55. Knobloch v. Smith, 25 F. Supp. 156, 157 (D. Conn. 1938). Decedent
owned 14,778 shares of a stock of which 200 shares were sold at $19 per share on
the valuation date. "The Government relie[d] solely on the proposition that certain
provisions of the regulations, which require disregard of blockage, are controlling."
Id. at 157. Noting that so large a block of stock could have been sold on valuation
date only "to an underwriter . . . who would want a concession of from three to five
points below the market," the court valued the stock at $15 per share. Id. at 156.
56. Accord, Commissioner v. Shattuck, 97 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1938); Jenkins v.
Smith, 21 F. Supp. 251, 253 (D. Conn. 1937), wherein the court stated: "Although
there was no actual necessity for a sale of the total block of stock on the date of the de-
cedent's death, the determination of the fair market value as of that date requires the
estimation of the price that could have been obtained for all the shares on that day,
for the reason that fair market value as of a given date means the price that could
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After encountering this judicial reluctance, the blockage proscription
was deleted from the regulations.5 7  The demise of this prohibition
made possible a realistic valuation of large blocks of stock. Con-
versely, the new mutual fund share regulation precludes valuation on a
realistic basis. This lack of economic reality has been a key factor in
the recent judicial refusals to uphold Treasury Regulation 20.2031-
8(b).
Regulation 20.2031-8(b) and the Courts
Courts refusing to uphold Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b)
have treated it as "unrealistic" and "artificial. 'S8  When this regula-
tion is taken in combination with the 1965 amendment to Treasury
Regulation 20.2031-1(b), it appears as not only an unrealistic regula-
tion but one which ignores the legislative intent of statutes pertaining to
the estate tax, as revealed in earlier regulatory constructions and court
interpretations. 59 However, the courts initially failed to question its
lack of economic reality. The first challenge to Treasury Regulation
20.2031-8(b) occurred in Wells v. Commissioner."e Noting that
treasury regulations are not to be held invalid merely because a tax-
payer suggests reasonable or preferable alternatives, but "are to be sus-
tained unless they are found to be unreasonable and plainly inconsis-
actually have been realized on that date." But cf. Richardson v. Helvering, 80 F.2d
548 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Roth v. Wardell, 77 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1935).
57. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 10, T.D. 4902, 1939-1 CuM. BULL. 325. Eventually,
"the pressure of judicial recognition of the blockage concept culminated in its inclusion
in the 1958 Regulations." Riecker, Blockage in Federal Estate and Gift Tax Valuation,
42 MICH. ST. B.J., Aug. 1963, at 26. Current Treasury Regulation 20.2031-2(e) pro-
vides for consideration of the size of the block of stock to be valued "[ijn certain
exceptional cases." The taxpayer still has to present convincing evidence that placing
the block to be valued on the market within a reasonable period from valuation date
would have depressed the price per share.
58. E.g., Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1971):
"To include [the sales commission] in the value of the shares to the estate creates an
artificial value. . . ."; Davis v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 949, 955 (C.D. Cal. 1969):
"To include the fictitious sales commission in the value of the shares to the estate is to
create an artificial value that cannot possibly be obtained by the estate in any readily
accessible, realistic market"; Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Colo.
1971): "[T]his regulation. . . taxes a value which does not exist." See also J. RABKiN
& M. JOHNSoN, 4 FEDERAL INCOME, Giwr & ESTATE TAXATION § 52.11, at 5291 (1972):
"The Sixth Circuit. . . has upheld this unrealistic regulation."
59. "Ithe 1963 and 1965 amendments to the Regulations . . . [appear] to be a
dangerous and unwarranted departure from the traditional fair market value concept
developed by the courts in which the determination of the price obtainable between a
willing buyer and a willing seller is oriented to the market or markets available to the
holder of the property being valued." Report of the Committee on Estate and Gift
Taxes, 19 BuLL. A.B.A. SECION OF TAXATON, July 1966, at 74.
60. 50 T.C. 871 (1968).
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tent with the revenue statutes,"'" the Tax Court with six judges dis-
senting concluded that the regulation was reasonable. Soon after the
Wells decision, the analogous gift tax regulation62 came before the Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Indiana in Howell v. United
States.6' The Howell court citing Wells declared that it was "not con-
vinced . . . that the Regulation . . . is unreasonable or out of har-
mony with the statute."64  The Sixth Circuit also affirmed the Tax
Court's Wells decision noting that although prior to 1963 the regula-
tions had not prescribed valuation of mutual fund shares at public
offering price, "[tihe Commissioner has chosen [another] criterion
and, if it is a reasonable one, we are not at liberty to second guess
him."65
The trend to hold the regulation invalid began with Davis v.
United States66 in which the District Court for the Central District of
California concluded that a regulation so unrealistic could not be
reasonable. This opinion has been cited approvingly by the district
courts for both the Western District of New York 67 and the District of
Colorado.68 The Second Circuit in Cartwright v. United States"9 also
has recently held that Treasury Regulation 20.2031-8(b) is unrealistic
and establishes an improper criterion for valuation of mutual fund
shares. The Ninth Circuit has affirmed the Davis decision,7" thus be-
coming the second court of appeals to hold Treasury Regulation
20.2031-8(b) invalid. The United States Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in the Cartwright decision 7' and will resolve the present con-
flict. A brief review of the arguments for and against Treasury Regu-
lation 20.2031-8 (b) may suggest what the outcome will be in the Su-
preme Court.
Arguments Presented in the Cases
The commissioner in support of Treasury Regulation 20.2031-
8(b) points out that it is consistent with the 1965 revision of 20.2031-
61. Id. at 875.
62. An amendment providing for valuation of mutual fund shares at public offer-
ing price for gift tax purposes was added to the gift tax regulations at the same time
that the mutual fund amendment was added to the estate tax regulations. T.D. 6680,
1963-2 CuM. BULL. 417.
63. 290 F. Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1968), af'd, 414 F.2d 45 (7th Cir. 1969).
64. Id. at 694.
65. Ruehlmann v. Commissioner, 418 F.2d 1302, 1304 (1969), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 950, rehearing denied, 400 U.S. 856 (1970).
66. 306 F. Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
67. Cartwright v. United States, 323 F. Supp. 769, 772 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
68. Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474, 480-81 (D. Colo. 1971).
69. Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 571-72 (2d Cir. 1972).
70. Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).
71. 41 U.S.L.W. 3183 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1972).
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1(b). 72  Furthermore, he contends that the only willing buyer-willing
seller transaction which occurs with regard to mutual funds is the one
in which individuals purchase shares at the public offering price since
the fund is required by statute to redeem shares at a set redemption
price.73  The district court in Cartwright noted that this "theory disre-
gards the facts of acquisition ' 7 4 where shares are acquired by inheri-
tance or at redemption price through reinvestment of dividends. 5
The court also criticized the argument's disregard of the fact that "both
the buyer and seller. . . willingly enter into the transaction,"7 6 which in-
cludes agreement on the part of the fund to redeem the shares at net
asset value when the owner decides to sell them. The Ninth Circuit
similarly declared that open-end investment companies are willing
buyers when they redeem shares since "the redemption market is the
market upon which both parties agree when the shares are purchased.
The mutual fund chooses to operate in such form under the law and
the public buys shares in the fund fully apprised of its redemption op-
portunities through company prospectuses. '7 7  The Investment Com-
pany Institute"8 states that the decision to engage in business as an
open-end investment company entails a voluntary decision to accept
the legal obligation to redeem shares and that a mutual fund is thus a
"willing buyer.
'7 9
The commissioner also argued that mutual fund shares should be
valued similarly to insurance policies on the life of a person other than
the decedent and annuity contracts, which had previously been in a
category by themselves for estate tax valuation. 0 The majority in
Wells v. Commissioner was persuaded that the 1963 amendment to the
regulations placing mutual funds in the same category with such insur-
ance and annuity contracts was "recognition that investment company
shares are a different breed of cats from ordinary stocks and bonds; and
72. Cartwright v. United States, 457 F.2d 567, 571 (2d Cir. 1972). See text ac-
companying notes 37-40 supra.
73. Wells v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 871, 876 (1968).
74. 323 F. Supp. at 772.
75. Shareholders of some load funds are able to purchase additional shares at
net asset value through reinvestment of dividends. H.R. REP., supra note 9, at 215.
76. 323 F. Supp. at 772.
77. Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1972).
78. The Investment Company Institute is a trade association of the mutual fund
industry. Its members hold about ninety-three percent of all mutual fund assets. H.R.
REP., supra note 9, at 4 n.15.
79. Brief for Investment Company Institute as Amicus Curiae at 18, Davis v.
United States, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1972).
80. "The .Treasury has . . . grouped mutual funds with those few types of assets
which are valued at replacement cost." Marks, Little-Publicized Valuation Regs.
Mean Higher Estate and Gift Taxes, 22 J. TAXATION 286 (1965). At the time this
article was published, Treasury Regulation section 20.2031-1(b) had not been revised
in an endeavor to add "property in general" to those "few types of assets" so valued.
See text accompanying notes 28-35 supra.
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when it comes to valuing them, a different criterion can reasonably be
applied, more nearly like that applied to life insurance and annuity con-
tracts than stocks and bonds."'" Unconvinced by this reasoning, the
Colorado district court observed: "The Commissioner cannot cross-
breed life insurance and investment trust shares by the simple expedient
of discussing them in separate paragraphs of a single regulation. 8 - In
Cartwright the Second Circuit fully concurred in the district court's re-
fusal to accept the insurance-mutual fund share analogy.8" In the
words of the district court, "mutual funds and insurance policies are so
different that the bundle of rights in each cannot be compared."8" A
Supreme Court case concerning valuation of an insurance policy has
emphasized the contractual obligation of the insurer to pay a sum
certain at a future date."' As noted in the Wells dissent, "there was no
evidence that the [insurance] policy could not have been sold, albeit in
a limited market, at its replacement value or at least at a price in excess
of its cash surrender value."' 86  In contrast "[t]he ordinary and only
practical method of disposition [of mutual fund shares] is redemption."87
The commissioner further argued that since inclusion of the ex-
cise tax in valuation of jewelry for estate and gift tax purposes has re-
ceived court approval, 88 inclusion of the sales load in valuation of mu-
tual fund shares similarly should be sanctioned. 89  The cases involving
excise tax, however, emphasized taxpayer's failure to produce evi-
dence supporting valuation at a lower price than that which had been
paid.9" One court concluded that the price paid by the taxpayer and
"market value realizable on sale of the diamonds to an individual for
his personal use might well have been substantially the same."91  Rev-
81. 50 T.C. 871, 876 (1968).
82. Hicks v. United States, 335 F. Supp. 474, 482 (D. Colo. 1971).
83. 457 F.2d 567, 570 (2d Cir. 1972).
84. 323 F. Supp. 769, 773 (W.D.N.Y. 1971).
85. Guggenheim v. Rasquin, 312 U.S. 254, 257 (1941): "[Tlhe owner of a
fully paid life insurance policy . . . has the right . . . to receive the face amount of
the policy upon the insured's death." See text accompanying notes 30-34 supra.
86. 50 T.C. at 879 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
87. 323 F. Supp. at 771.
88. Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1953), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 924 (1954); Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied,
345 U.S. 906 (1953); Gould v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 414 (1950).
89. Howell v. United States, 414 F.2d 45, 49 (7th Cir. 1969).
90. "The sole evidence consisted of the cost to the taxpayer of obtaining the
jewelry...." Duke v. Commissioner, 200 F.2d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 1952). "The court
[in Publicker v. Commissioner] stated that in view of the irreconcilable conflict of
testimony of the expert witnesses, the cost of the jewelry, including ... excise tax, was
considered as the best evidence of value." Rev. Rul. 55-71, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 110,
111.
91. Publicker v. Commissioner, 206 F.2d 250, 254 (3d Cir. 1953).
[Vol. 24THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
enue Ruling 55-7*1 further reveals the difficulty in drawing support
for inclusion of the sales load by analogy to inclusion of the excise tax
in valuation for estate tax purposes:
The existence of the Federal excise tax on jewelry, furs, and other
related articles of personal property sold by dealers, is an item
which will tend to increase the amount at which an individual or
an estate would be willing to sell such property ...
In view of the foregoing, it is held that the Federal excise tax on
• ..articles of personal property is a relevant factor which should
be considered in determining the fair market value of such prop-
erty for Federal estate and gift tax purposes.
9 2
Since the only practical manner of disposing of mutual fund shares
is to resell them to the issuing company at redemption price, Judge
Tannenwald, in his cogent and persuasive dissent in Wells, compared
the situation of a person wishing to sell his mutual fund shares to that
of one wishing to sell stock subject to a binding restriction, requiring
that the "shares may not be sold without offering them to a third person
at a certain price" in which case "that price becomes the ceiling for
determining the fair market value of the shares for estate tax purposes." 93
Similarly, the district court in Davis concluded that "[allthough there is
no binding contract in this case, the rationale of Treas. Reg. 20.2031-
2(h) (1958) should apply to open-end investment shares because the
redemption price offered by the company truly represents the only
realistic value that the estate can obtain for the shares of the open-end
investment company."94  On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the commis-
sioner contended that the trial court had "erred in its analogy of mu-
tual fund shares to a stock or bond that is subject to a binding contract
to purchase" because such restrictive agreements "may operate to af-
fect the fair market value of property for estate tax purposes [only if]
the executor is obligated to sell for the price fixed by the agreement." 95
However, courts have repeatedly held that a restrictive agreement re-
quiring the owner of stock to offer it to certain parties at a specified
price before selling it to anyone else has a depressing effect upon the
fair market value of the stock. Even if the right to purchase is not ex-
ercised by those who have the right of first refusal, the owner cannot
expect to sell the stock for the price he could obtain were it not en-
cumbered by a restriction. Thus fair market value in this instance as
92. Rev. Rul. 55-71, 1955-1 CuM. BULL. 110, 111 (emphasis added).
93. 50 T.C. at 878 (Tannenwald, J., dissenting).
94. 306 F. Supp. at 955. When securities are subject to an option or contract to
purchase under which the decedent was not free to dispose of them "at any price he
chooses during his lifetime" and which "represents a bona fide business arrangement,"
the option or contract price is considered in determining fair market value. Treas.
Reg. § 20.2031-2(h), T.D. 6296, 1958-2 CuM. BULL. 481.
95. Brief for Appellant at 15-16, Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769 (9th Cir.
1972).
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in others is determined by what the owner can realize in money for his
property. "
Conclusion
The Securities and Exchange Commission recently stated: "A
person who invests in a load fund does not obtain an interest in the
fund equal in value to the amount that he pays for his shares, since the
sales load is first deducted from the purchase price."9 7  Thus Treasury
Regulation 20.2031-8(b) is inconsistent not only with the term value
as used in Section 2031 of the Internal Revenue Code but also with the
provision in Section 2033 that the gross estate is to include the value
of all property "to the extent of the interest therein of the decedent at
the time of his death.""8  These inconsistencies were recognized in
Davis:
The sales load is a charge for service which is paid by the buyer at
purchase and never recovered. It adds nothing to the value of the
shares. . . . To apply the estate tax rate to the sales charge paid
is to impose a tax on a nonexistent "interest of the decedent."
The regulation which permits it . . . is inconsistent with . . . 26
U.S.C. § 2033. 99
The principal justifications of the Federal Estate Tax are generally
considered to be production of revenue and prevention of excessive
concentrations of wealth.100 If these considerations now justify a change
in the manner in which property is valued for estate tax purposes,
the change should not culminate in a procedure which is patently
unrealistic. If the commissioner wishes to effect changes, he must do
so within the bounds of the congressional mandate from which he de-
rives his authority and by regulations not inconsistent with the statutes
they are designed to implement. Hopefully, the Supreme Court will
resolve the current conflict between the statutes and regulations by af-
firming the decision in Cartwright v. United States.
Evelyn R. Epstein*
96. E.g., Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578, 582 (Ist
Cir. 1943) wherein the court stated: "To be sure the restriction does not affect the
value of the stock so long as the owner does not wish to sell, but it is not this value
which, under the regulations, is to be used as the basis for computing the tax. The
value to be used for this purpose is the 'fair market value' . . . . ... Accord, Mathews
v. United States, 226 F. Supp. 1003 (E.D.N.Y. 1964). But see Koch v. Commis-
sioner, 28 B.T.A. 363 (1933); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 23
B.T.A. 663 (1931).
97. H.R. RP., supra note 9, at 52.
98. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2033.
99. Davis v. United States, 460 F.2d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1972).
100. R. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERrry 214-15 (1947).
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[Vol. 24
